Israel as a Jewish State

By: Naomi Goldstein Cohen

The nature of 'Jewish' in the state of Israel is under debate. Cohen explores the origins of the conflict and a possible solutions within the framework of religious Zionism.

This today is generally understood in terms of using political machinery to ensure a modicum of halachic observance in the public domain, at the same time endeavoring to achieve the rule of Torah at least in the lives of Torah true Jews, by positioning halachic authorities to be the directors of all the actions of those who are committed to halachic Judaism.

In support of this 'parochial' type of Torah state it is cogently argued that since all aspects of individual and communal life should be lived in the spirit and the letter of Torah, that at least for Torah true Jews, residing in the contemporary religious authorities, must be actively sought for guidance in all activities. Clearly included are not only every aspect of Shabbat, Taharat Hamishpakha et sim., but also social mores of all kinds, and as a matter of course all decisions pertaining to the affairs of the community.

It is pointed out that since there are chapters in the classic Codes relating to all these areas, they ought if at all possible, be subject to the detailed guidance of the halachic authorities, who should be consulted on all matters, great and small, and followed without demur, and the principle of (faith of the sages) is adduced in support of the expectation of unquestioning obedience to these authorities.

On the face of it, as the bearers of the dream of the Torah of Israel, for the People of Israel, in the land of Israel, we should rejoice at the degrees to which organized religion has gained hegemony over the religiously committed, as well as the significant political clout it has acquired; but many of us find ourselves less than happy and more than a little troubled.

Where has theory become divorced from life, or perhaps more correctly: what are the mistaken terms in the equation we have constructed, for accurate results depend upon the consideration of the appropriate factors.

We will begin with a look at the term 'Theocracy' as this seems to be the closest approximation to our notion of a Torah State, its origin, a short comparison of it with alternate systems of government, and a cursory survey of how it has functioned in history -Jewish and otherwise. Afterwards, we will turn to the contemporary scene, analyze it, and attempt to draw some operative conclusions.

The term Theocracy was originally coined by Josephus to describe government according to the Torah by means of a priestly class.1 Since the hachamim -the Sages -have long replaced priests in their legislative and judicial duties and prerogatives we are justified in also using the term to describe the government according to the Torah through the agency of the hachamim -the Rabbis and the Roshei-Yeshivot. In terms of political theory, the epitome of this form is the Platonic ideal of the Philosopher King.2

At the other end of the spectrum from Theocracy, we find the ideal of the "separation of church and state" -the principle upon which the American political system is based.

This form must not be rejected out of hand as irrelevant to the central goal of religious Zionism for it does not in fact remove religion from the public domain, nor is it necessarily a hindrance to the flowering of organized religion.

Experience shows that the very reverse of this may well be the case. In the event we find that in America, the classic instance of this system in practice, though there is no established church, neither is religion, nor are religious symbols and practices divorced from the state. In fact, outside the major urban centers, America is probably one of the most religious countries in the western world.

The axiomatic acceptance of religion as part of the basic fabric of American culture is almost too obvious to need illustration. Nevertheless, we will bring a few random examples of religious expression in the public domain in America which immediately come to mind, for those not familiar with them.

The motto, 'in God we trust' is engraved on American money. Representatives of the major religions deliver an invocation at the inauguration of the President. The major Christian holidays are celebrated in virtually all public places. The official day of rest is Sunday and though their stringency differs from State to State and from municipality to municipality, just about everywhere there are laws which regulate the opening of places of commerce and entertainment on this day.

Thus, despite the zealously guarded principle of 'separation of church and state', the public domain in America is imbued with a specifically religious, and one might even say, Christian spirit, for absolute separation would reflect a positive attitude towards atheism -which is patently not what the founding fathers of the U.S. had in mind, nor does it reflect the existential reality of the American people.

I repeat: the separation in the United States is between 'Church' and the State. Though there is an attempt upon the part of some today to make it so, this separation was not intended as a rejection of religion, nor is it usually so construed. Religion in the United States is not separated from the State -but no church can depend on government coercion to secure the adherence of its followers, or the fulfillment of its precepts.

We wish to suggest that in Israel today, some modification of this pattern may better serve the objective of ensuring a modicum of specifically Jewish forms and behaviour in the public domain than the system currently in force, and what is even more important, though all too often forgotten, will be more likely than the present system to keep a love of Judaism and Jewish things alive in the hearts and souls of those Jews living in Israel.

It is our thesis that paradoxically, some variation of the American pattern is far more likely to advance the cause of religion in Israel today, than the English system of an 'Established Church' which we have inherited from the days of the Mandate, and that even less desirable is the rule of bodies of Chachamim, whether directly or through the agencies of political parties, which several religious segments have adopted, and which some amongst us are also trying to introduce into the Religious-Zionist camp -using the Chief Rabbinate as the parallel to the [counsel of sages].

This would indeed be quite close to a theocracy, if not identical with it. It is also the system current in many Arab countries, where no clear distinction is made between the religious and the political establishments.

 

In the days of the First Temple the division of functions between the political and the sacerdotal office holders, though not always preserved in practice, was nevertheless clearly demarcated.

There was a religious establishment in the form of a regular Temple priesthood upon whom fell the privilege and the responsibility of serving the sacramental needs of the people. Though it was closely connected with the monarchy and sometimes quite powerful politically, ultimate power resided in the Monarchy. While direct religious experience, and apparently much of the spiritual guidance of the people, resided, not with the priesthood, but with the prophets -irrespective of whether or not they were of priestly lineage.

Likewise, at the very beginning of the Second Commonwealth we find Zerubabel of the Davidic dynasty and Joshua the High Priest as the leaders of the first group to return to Jerusalem. And then too, prophets seem to have been a far from negligible factor in the messianic politics of the times.

Nevertheless, one of the striking realities of the Second Commonwealth is that during most of its existence, it was both in name and in fact a 'Theocracy'; for thanks to the guidelines of the Cyrus Declaration, its political organization was that of a Temple State governed by a priestly aristocracy -who were of course presumably the representatives of the Divine Prerogative.

At the same time it is also abundantly clear that paradoxically, this was in fact conducive neither to a high spiritual level of the incumbent priestly families nor to the adoption of the Torah as the basis for behavior by the people, the latter eventually occurring, in spite of, not because of, the local theocratic establishment.

It is perhaps not irrelevant to contemporary considerations to note that although Ezra was of priestly lineage, both he and Nehemia entered the arena of religious revival in the theocratic State of Judea, from outside the local established religious framework, and were indeed at serious loggerheads with it. They avoided disturb­ing the foundations of the theocratic government, perhaps because their authority stemmed from the very same Persian government which had originally established it.

This theocratic form of Temple-State governed by the priestly aristocracy continued undisturbed -as so much else did -after the conquest of Alexander the Great. But as we all know, it was no more conducive in Hellenistic times either to good government, or to good religion than formerly. Indeed, the nasty political intrigues of the House of Zadok, which eventually included the desecration of the Temple in the days preceding the Maccabean revolt, are a good illustration of how Judea could at one and the same time be a Theocracy -governed by the officiating priesthood -and also very negative from a Torah standpoint!

Once we realize this, we also become aware of the fact that the early Hasmoneans were actually not innovators in their uniting the priestly office and secular rule.3 They merely continued what they found4, and this combination of 'church and state' in the extreme theocratic form continued till the demise of the Hasmonean dynasty5. During most of its existence it was hardly the major positive religious factor.

With this as background, let us now consider what the ideal rela­tionship should be between 'established' religious authority, private religious institutions, and religion as a personal existential experience.

While all three foci are important there is a natural tension in their interaction. 6 Perhaps one of the secrets of the success of Judaism over the ages has been the fact that none of them has either ever gained complete control or been entirely outlawed. When they are in a state of balanced inter-relation they serve to guard against both the excesses of arid formalism and the potentially antinomian tendencies frequently associated with enthusiastic religious phenomena.

Likewise, the existence of extra-establishment institutions have during the course of our long history often served as salient correctives for the natural disintegration and decline imminent in all institutions -not excepting those of religion.

To put it somewhat more broadly: Religion which is by definition of a spiritual nature can exist in this world only when embodied in material forms -viz. organizational frameworks.

However, everything material is under the dominion of time ­there was a time when it was not and there will be a time when it will no longer be, and religious establishments are no exception. Inherent in their very being and necessary to their functioning as bridges between the infinite and eternal, and the finite temporal here and now, is the material essence which by definition is, like the human species and everything else in this world -subject to senescence.

Hence one must be very careful not to subject the natural divine mechanisms, which bring about the renewal and eventual replacement of the time-bound elements of the religious establishment, for when these evolutionary processes are unduly thwarted the results have often been radical rebellion -both in former times and today -the bitter fruits of which hardly require description.

For example: In Hellenistic-Roman times the degeneration of the priestly religious hierarchy was almost certainly an important contributory factor to the spawning and spread of the manifold heterodoxies such as the Dead Sea Sects on the one hand, whose halacha was in many respects more stringent than that of the Pharisees, and on the other, anti-nomian Messianic movements.

At the same time, since in much of Second Temple times the priestly aristocracy was in a state of antagonism with charismatic and other 'extra establishment' groups, the activity of these groups, side by side with the priestly 'establishment' put brakes on the latter, and eventually provided a viable substitute for it. It is hardly mere chance that the final eclipse of the Hasmonean dynasty, which as long as it lasted stood at the apex of both the religious and the political pyramid, and the rise of the house of Hillel and the Davidic Patriarchate, occurred at more or less the same point in time.

Those whose historical frame of reference includes a grounding in the history of Europe during the Middle Ages through the Reformation and down to the creation of the modern national state are only too aware of the dangers inherent in a strong clerical establishment closely affiliated with the secular power, (e.g. Spain in the day of the Inquisition) as well as of the identification of the institutions of Religion with the State -England in the time of Cromwell, etc. There is no reason to suppose that we as Jews are immune to these dangers.

Thus, the relevant questions for us as religious Zionists today, are 1) to what extent should the hegemony of the 'religious establishment' be a desideratum, and 2) to what extent should we continue to attempt to use the coercive powers of the State to enforce halachic observance?

More and more seriously thinking religious people are coming to the conclusion that what may have been natural and necessary in he Socialist regime of the early days of the State, when everything n the nascent society was almost entirely dependent -financial­and otherwise -on the central national institutions, may no longer be the best strategy today in a political structure much loser to the western liberal democratic tradition. Indeed, the status quo' of forty years' standing, and what is happening in connection with it, is the epitome of what is amiss in the present relationship between Judaism and the State.

It is almost a truism that in the realm of the spirit, innovations are introduced by pneumatic charismatic personalities. Then comes the next and vital stage of institutionalization, for only thus can the creative sparks be preserved.

However, since everything in this world -Whether people, things, institutions, or whatever -is subject to the laws of birth and decay; and since nothing in the mundane sphere can ever remain the same, but must be constantly growing, growing old, and starting again, the ensuing stage after institutionalization must of necessity be either stagnation with its concomitant decay or renewal.

This hardly needs illustration. One need only call to mind the history of various Hasidic courts. The first two stages were the same for all but some of them have stagnated while others have been renewed and flower today as in former times. 7

The Zionist movement is a similar case in point, as is the Kibbutz movement, and what holds true for all these, holds true for the contemporary Religious-State modus vivendi in Israel today.8

The famous status quo is a facet of this inherent 'law'. It is the institutional perpetuation of a specific moment in time, without thought to the changing realities, and therefore it has decayed.

Indeed, though the "status quo" is being frontally attacked and frantically defended as though it were an important dyke in the religious bulwarks, in actual fact, much of it is today no more than empty shell, and one can almost say that it has ceased to exist in any meaningful sense -not because it has been disregarded, but because it is no longer relevant to the current existential situation.

But lest it be misunderstood, as we shall explain in the ensuing discussion, no doubt some legislation is required. What is being questioned is whether the present 'what' and 'how' are indeed contributing to the desired objective: the maximalizing of the Jewish character of the State of Israel.

 

It is indeed high time that we once again take a closer look at the "status-quo" to ascertain what it once had to offer and to consider to what extent it still remains of value.

When the State was founded, the "status-quo" agreed upon ensured a more or less traditional atmosphere to the community. This is no longer so today -and indeed would not be so even were its terms preserved in all their minutae.

Following is a sampling of some of the major areas involved. More often than not technological or socio-economic developments have altered circumstances so radically that little meaning is to be gained by the preservation of the specific 'religious legislation' and nothing significant to be lost in terms of 'Yiddishkeit' by its disappearance.

By and large, busses are still forbidden to run on Shabbat.

When few people owned private cars, this law gave the streets of the major cities a palpable Shabbat atmosphere, but today when someone in almost every family -rich or poor -owns a car, this is no longer so.

I remember walking in the streets of Jerusalem on a Shabbat after­noon some years ago after a long absence. The first reaction was: 'How much more observant the people of Jerusalem used to be. In the 60's hardly any cars used to go by on Shabbat in this neighborhood!'

But then it was realized that what had really occurred was not so much an erosion in religious commitment, as a sharp rise in the standard of living. The same families who used to live in two rooms in the center of town, and could hardly make ends meet, now possessed all the modern amenities, including cars.

Many of these people hadn't driven cars on Shabbat on former days, not only because they had no need to -since all their friends and relatives lived within walking distance and unlike today, Jerusalem was still full of wild 'nature haunts' -but for the even simpler reason that they had no car.

Thus, while formerly the absence of public transportation brought in its wake a restful atmosphere, today the net result of the buses not running on Shabbat is that instead of one bus we now have several cars, while even those who own no cars use the organized inexpensive taxi shuttles which also involve several cars to one bus.

Nothing is gained as far as the Shabbat atmosphere of the non­observant is concerned. But resentment of the religious establishment, and more rather than less 11' on the roads are the unintended but hardly avoidable side-effects.

Are we not dealing with an obsolete symbol, rather than with a viable existential realty.

Likewise the 'status-quo' concerning places of entertainment which until recently kept movie houses closed is another illustration of a battle over something whose relevance has become at best peripheral, and as a statute meant to minimize the [desecration of Shabbat] connected with Friday night entertainment almost completely obsolete, and positively counterproductive.

The demonstrations, with all the concomitant [Shabbat desecration] and hilul hashem, reflect the desperation of the religious establishment; but even their success would not really improve the Shabbat atmosphere of the non-religious Israeli one iota.

The issue has lost all contact with reality, for movies are no longer a major form of entertainment, while Discotheques, which are not part of the 'status quo' and so proliferate undisturbed, are far more objectionable from every religious standard of measurement ­whether it be Shabbat observance, kashrut, modesty of behavior, intemperate drinking, or general license. Precious few who are kept from going to the movies are thus kept from [Shabbat desecration]. The choice is no longer between the films and the Shabbat table, but between the movie house and the Discotheque. What has been gained? What is the fight all about?

Divested of its symbolic valence the whole issue would hardly be of major interest. Relatively few people go to the movies any more compared to the number who prefer to engage in other activities on Friday night which are no less forbidden, and no more in the spirit of Shabbat!

Closer to the heart of the problem are the ongoing battles in the arena of the elementary and secondary school systems. These are causing the greatest and most irreparable damage.

While many religious parents demand the right to open 'better' more selective religious schools for their children, rather than send them to the local Mamlachti-Dati school, at the very same time they or others of the same circles declare a 'holy-war' on the attempts of non-orthodox parents to open schools with an enriched traditional Jewish content within the framework of the non-orthodox General-State trend.

Those same religious circles who do not consider the Religious State schools to be close enough to their way of life to satisfy them, and therefore do not hesitate to undermine them by opening competitive institutions, are not prepared to grant the same privilege to those among the non-religious, who also want what they consider to be a 'better' and more Jewish education than that presently available in the General State Trend.

Clearly, if pluralism in the field of religious education is looked upon as something positive, or at the very least, as an inherent civil right when practiced by those who consider the neighborhood religious schools insufficiently demanding religiously, it must in elementary fairness also be granted to those who are at the other end of the spectrum, for whom these same schools are not suitable, for the very reason that they do make uncompromising demands concerning the religious practice in the homes of the children attending these schools.

The net result of the present policy is tragically Kafkaesque. While the neighborhood religious schools are not considered religious enough in the eyes of many religious parents, the majority of Israeli Jewish children are effectively deprived of anything that smacks of serious Jewish tradition, since on the one hand they are discouraged from attending these very schools unless their parents agree to 'toe the line' in their overt religious behaviour, while at the same time the option of Masorti schools as part of the General State Trend is stymied.

Here too, I suspect that what was once a reasonable attempt to keep children from traditional homes from defecting to the General -State Educational trend, now instead results in the minimalization of the Jewish content of the education of vast numbers of Israeli children.

On the thorny question of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rabbinical courts in matters of personal status: though this has been until recently axiomatically considered to be the most important of all the laws respecting religious matters, since it was considered to be vital for the preservation of the unity of the Jewish people, there are some who have come to the conclusion that today, even in this area, the real -and not merely the symbolic -objective will be closer to achievement if the option of civil-marriage be provided!

It is by now common knowledge in American Rabbinical circles that according to the Pesak of the late renowned Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, where Orthodox Chupa and Kiddushin are available, those who knowingly do not avail themselves of it, are considered to have expressed their desire not to enter into it, and to have thus specifically 'opted-out'.

Rabbi Halevi of Tel Aviv has also recently declared himself to be of the view that civil marriage may in fact be preferable to forcing all couples to have Chupa and Kiddushin, for under the circumstances just noted, in the absence of the traditional presumption, the need for a proper 'get' upon the dissolution of such a un­ion would be less absolute.9

This would unfortunately do away with the present Rabbinical monopoly in this area. At the same time it might also provide the 'halachic emergency' which could just possibly succeed in overcoming the , situation which has caused not only so much suffering and heartache to women trapped in impossible situations for many generations, but now with the alienation of ever larger segments of the nation from traditional Judaism, in the proliferation of ', spawned by the ever increasing number of couples for whom the halachic formalities, if unattainable, are no longer in dispensable.

Here too then, under the circumstances as they are, not as we would like them to be, the net result of the introduction of the option of civil marriage would very likely be fewer mammzerim, rather than the other way around.

One could continue this list but the point is clear. Many of the 'religious' battles being fought with such vigour today are neither over the real issues nor are they being waged with the most efficacious weapons.

Political power is something that comes and goes. It is most short­sighted to suppose that the fact that the religious parties until now almost always managed to maneuver themselves into a position of power is any indication that this will remain so forever, or even for much longer.

If the influence of Jewish values, forms and traditions i.e. the practical expression of halacha in the character of the State ­depends on political pressure and nothing else, the day is not far off, when, G-d forbid, all signs of Judaism will disappear in Israel.

Today the religious parties have quite some power. Tomorrow, when this power will be gone, the potential backlash may very well be at least initially so severe that there will be a wholesale erasing of the 'religious' laws; so much so that a religious Jew may no longer be able to work in many areas because of the impossibility of keeping Shabbat in their place of work, he will not be able to eat in most public institutions, and in the absence of state-support, even religious schooling may well become a luxury that many families will hardly be able to afford.

I have painted the picture in sombre hue, in order to stress that coercion is no solution and may well become a counter productive boomerang, and is today certainly a grave mistake.

True, most of the laws involved have long been on the books, but a generation ago laws which are now experienced as coercive, enjoyed the virtual consensus of large segments of society -and it is the subjective, rather than the objective reality, which is relevant in this respect.

Even 40 years ago only those things were achieved concerning which there was widespread consensus; and some of the members of the Marxist Zionist factions were perhaps even more violent than their opposite numbers are today, in their attempts to eradicate the influence of what they considered to be the 'opiate of the masses'. The difference is not at the fringes, but the attitude and feelings of the silent majority.

Subjectively, the feeling of coercion was hardly very great for them then, when most people were committed to Jewish tradition and a Jewish life-style -even if their definition of them differed from those of us Orthodox Jews.

Though it was of course the religious parties who initiated the 'religious' laws and lobbied to have them passed, a generation ago except for fringe elements, the community as a whole felt more comfortable with these laws than they would have felt without them, and may even have found it convenient to be able to 'blame' the religious parties for things which otherwise they would have felt to be missing, had they not been there.

Further, the very justification for Zionism in the Western world was largely based on the Biblical tradition, and so it would have been highly impolitic to exclude the forms of religion from the emerging social and political structure.

But today, forty years later, the State of Israel is the same kind of fact as the State of Jordan. It needs no justification either in its own eyes or in the eyes of the world, beyond the simple fact of its existence, while many of those living in Israel, are not here as the result of any voluntary existential choice.

The majority of Jews in Israel today, were either born here or brought by their parents at a very young age. Hence there is no reason to assume that they are necessarily more committed to their Jewish identity than the vast majority of the Jews of the Western world who are also the children and grandchildren of committed Jews, while they themselves do not identify automati­cally with their Jewish heritage, know precious little of it, and have few if any qualms about assimilating entirely.

In view of all this I think it will be well for us to cease to equate the power of religion with the political clout of the religious establishment -taking it for granted that only the 'establishment' of religion can preserve its forms against the onslaughts of atheism and 'reform'.

There is another, and under the circumstances, a more viable option for the achievement of the goal of keeping the State of Israel "Jewish." This does not depend on the preservation of the "status quo" or any other quid pro quo of forced observance. Nor need we reasonably expect the majority of Jews in Israel to be 'orthodox' ­desirable as such a goal is in and of itself.

Beyond the relatively few who will go the entire way from irreligion to observant Judaism, there is a vast middlegroup who can be brought to love and respect Jewish tradition even if they do not find themselves personally strong enough to live completely according to its tenets.

We must begin to recognize that Judaism is not an all-or-nothing proposition. There is great immediate value, and even greater value in the long run, in bringing the many Jews in Israel today who are alienated, closer.

This is a sphere of activity particularly appropriate for us, for because of our modern life style and our full participation in all the endeavours -as well as in all the heartaches and all the joys -of the community at large, we are not as far removed from the non­observant Jew as other sectors of Orthodox Judaism.

What must be done at all costs is to foster and nurture with every means in our power, the positive identification of the average Jew in Israel with the forms and the content of Jewish tradition. He must be encouraged to identify with it and to love it deeply with a love strong enough, for it to be important to him that the State be traditionally Jewish to the very core of the fibre of its being.

Though We may not be at one with all aspects of the Ba'alei Teshuva movements, of the Habad outreach, and of the Gush Emunim propaganda, they are nevertheless, each in their own way, ample proof of the irresistible attraction that Judaism intrinsically has if only given half a chance.

Can there be serious doubt that our way -which sets as its goal what is today termed "Centrist", to indicate inter alia, that our understanding of Judaism, places it, and us with it, in the center of where the action is, potentially even more alluring. To me at least it is obviously inherently more beautiful and satisfying than the growths which continually sprout at both edges of the halachic path, and beyond. It can readily hold its own in the freemarket of open competition provided -to continue the simile -minimal care is given to the outer wrapping, and the 'marketing'.

We will be justified in being most sanguine in our prognosis concerning the future of the Jewish character of the State of Israel if, while not denying their value up to a point, We stop laying undue stress on horse trading tactics in the political arena and on arid destructive street demonstrations, and concentrate on positive action of a type germane to the essence of Judaism.

The strength of Judaism is such that it is surely not too late, and in any event any other strategy is at best a temporary stopgap which can bring no more than ephemeral achievement and even this will hardly be more than a pyrrhic victory in which the campaign may be won but at such a high cost, that nothing of any lasting value will be achieved.

This is not to suggest that all connection between religion and government be severed. By no means. To make myself clear I will conclude by suggesting a provisionally revised agenda. It will serve to give an idea of the areas in which I think 'religious' legislation should and will continue, and which we, as religious Zionists, will continue to support by whatever political means we will find most efficacious. I also think that there is quite a broad consensus on most of the points in this list.

 

1) Shabbat as the national day of rest, including the preservation of a six (or eventually five) day week for industrial plants, places of business and commerce, government offices, etc. Some of the Kibbutzim, in their early days, experimented with a 'personal' Shabbat which could be any day of the week, but abandoned it on their own initiative when they found that it destroyed the dimension of togetherness, and the possibility of joint cultural activities for everyone -for which a joint day of rest and relaxation is of course mandatory. I think that this aspect has perhaps not been sufficiently stressed.

2) The continued recognition of the religious calendar as the calendar of the State, the use of the Menorah and Magen David as official symbols, et sim. The greater the success in increasing the love of Judaism in the hearts of the general population, the broader will this area be.

3) The gradual introduction of Jewish Jurisprudence to replace the hodgepodge of foreign legal precedents when found appropriate.

This can, however, proceed only to the extent that the Judiciary and the members of the legal profession are provided with the relevant material in a readily usable format, and in language intelligible to the educated layman who has received no more than a superficial introduction to Talmudic and Halachic literature.

Though some beginnings have been made in this area -particularly in the early days of the State, and positive legislation has been enacted fairly recently, it has not proceeded nearly as rapidly as it could have even within the parameters of the legislation already on the books.

Part of the problem is the dearth of first rate Halachists with the necessary legal training and literary skills. Were more openness to the need for the acquisition of these skills found in the world of Torah, more young Talmidei-Chachamim would be motivated to prepare themselves accordingly -and if this were so, there is little doubt that additional financial encouragement would be given to programs working in this area. Because of our specific religious 'weltanschaung', our potential impact can hardly be exaggerated -nor can we legitimately shirk our particular responsibility in this sphere.

4) Another area of general interest in which a potentially large degree of consensus is possible, is the furtherance of what it takes ­financially and otherwise -to preserve Israel as the spiritual center of the Jewish people. Understood in these terms, the encouragement of institutions of Torah learning and scholarship which serve as a lodestone for Diaspora Jewry must continue apace. It is our task, as religious Zionists, to see to it that Torah institutions which inculcate in their students the conception of 'klal yisrael' which will make Torah and Jewish living respected and perhaps even loved by the at present non-affiliated, be given due recognition.

 

1) The State, municipalities and public institutions will continue to make the necessary arrangements to enable Orthodox Jews to function comfortably within the general framework of society ­perhaps the most vital facet being the preservation of Shabbat as a day when the vast majority of places of work are closed.

2) The State and municipalities will continue to enact and enforce measures such as penalties for misrepresentation in the area of Kashruth, the making of the giving of a 'get' a pre-requisite for a civil divorce including coercion if and when necessary10, at least where the couple was originally wed by Chupa and Kiddusin, et sim.

3) The State and local authorities will continue to subsidize religious schools, synagogues, Mikvaot, Torah classes, etc., for the same reason that it will also continue to subsidize other schools, theatres, sports, etc. -because these are the needs of significant numbers of citizens.

4) Additional and better laws in the realm of the general welfare and morality, such as non-pornographic advertising -not as specifically religious laws, but as a result of a broad consensus concerning their desirability, to which of course the religious segment of society will contribute.

 

The list is not meant to be exhaustive -but merely illustrates the sort of agenda we ought to give priority to today.

The raisons d'etre for all of this, are the religious services required by those who are religious, the good order of society, and the desire of the majority of Israelis to live in a Jewish state, not only Jewish in name and Jewish in population, but also, and not less so, Jewish in spirit, in customs and in traditions.

On the one hand this agenda has no theocratic ambitions. At the same time it takes as the birthright of every Jew in Israel -no less than in other liberal democracies -the making available of the means to live a full Jewish life for those committed to halacha. It also assumes that the majority of Israelis look upon the state of Israel as a Jewish state, and we look upon it as our task to further, by example and by positive conscious 'outreach', the Jewish dimension of the average Israeli Jew.

We are convinced that today this is most likely to be achieved by endeavouring to put into practice the famous principle of Hillel which he enunciated when he was called upon to put the entire Torah in a nutshell: (BT: Shabbat 31a) "Refrain from doing to others what you yourself would find objectionable." Hillel was of legendary fame in his ability to bring people closer to Judaism. Perhaps if we put renewed stress on his approach, we also will find our efforts to be crowned with an increasing degree of success.

 

1. Josephus, who apparently coined the term Theocracy, used it in Contra Apion II 165 as referring to the form of government which Moses gave to the Jewish people, in which all sovereignty and authority are in the hands of God...(184) which assigns the administration of its highest affairs to the whole body of priests, and entrusts to the supreme high priest the direction of the other priests...(187) ...this charge further embraced a strict superintendence of the Law and of the pursuits of everyday life; for the appointed duties of the priests included general supervision, the trial of cases of litigation, and the punishment of condemned persons...

2. Plato REPUBLIC V473: 'Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy... cities will never have rest from their evils. A theocracy is the religious parallel to the 'philosopher-king', and Moses is indeed so described by Philo, THE LIFE OF MOSES II 2: "For it has been said, not without good reason, that states can only make progress in well-being if either kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings. But Moses will be found to have displayed, and more than displayed, combined in his single person, not only these two faculties the kingly and the philosophical but also three others, one of which is concerned with law-giving, the second with the high priests's office, and the last with prophecy.

3. As is well known, the Sages were not happy with this combination in the hands of the Hasmonean dynasty.

4. Note for example that in The Letter of Aristeas 35, which describes the origin of the Septuagint, Ptolemy king of Egypt is described as sending a letter to the High Priest while the diplomatic usage is the one used for an exchange between sovereigns. (See the Dropsie College edition, edited and translated by Moses Hadas, 1951, note ad loc., p.112.). What­ever the date of the composition as a whole -and the tendency today is towards an early date -there is hardly any doubt that the author used authentic documents (see Cohen, Naomi: 'The Names of the Translators in The Letter of Aristeas: A Study in the Dynamics of Cul­tural Transition", JSJ XV 32-64,notes 1-3. Another reflection of this are the coins found with the inscriptions: JUDEA and the name of the High Priest.

5. Not even the 'Mityavnim" -the Hellenizers -wished to disestablish reli­gion for they had no intention of ceasing to be both rulers and priests. Nor would even the possible attempt on their part to turn Jerusalem into a Greek Polis (see Josephus, Ant. XII 237-241 and notes in Loeb ed.) have done so (though it would of course have changed the religious content). It was, after all, the Athenian Polis which passed the death sentence on Socrates, on grounds of religious non-conformity and corrupting the minds of the youth!

6. Their relative strength can be measured according to two scales -the one is in respect to the degree of power, wealth, and coercion which is theirs, while the other relates to their influence on the minds and hearts of the community. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but neither do they necessarily go hand in hand.

7. cf. Maier Orian

8. It is also well to remember that the religious Zionist movement was in its own day most anti-establishment. Shmuel Hayyim Landau, the founder of the Torah Ve-Avodah movement, and the ideologist of the Po'el Ham­izrachi movement, called for a 'holy rebellion'. See, S. Don-Yahya, Hamered Hakadosh. Hadbeen followed blindly there would have been precious little religious-Zionist Aliya, and surely no Kibbutzim.

9. Though it would not of course have any effect on those who were already married.

10. For precedents see E. E.Urbach, Mosa Bialik, Jerusalem, 1955, p. 344.

This article belongs to the following subjects:

• Judaism » Israeli Judaism
• Zionism » Religious Zionism